LBl

+,661

4'3.::1"
1081

Ol
SIS3Hl
llO:J/dS

Campus Honors Program
University of South Florida
St. Petersburg, Florida

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

Honors Thesis

This is to certify that the Honors Thesis of

T AKAKO T AYAMA LUlZ

has been approved by th e Examining Committee
on 5 August 1994
as satisfactory for th e thesis requirement
for the Campus Honors Program

Examining Committee:

M~~~~~~~~-Ph.D.______

%-lntt_

--~~~( ____________________
~~mber: David R. Carr, Ph.D.

-

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE APPLICATION OF
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY:
AN ANALYSIS OF
THE USE OF
COMPUTERIZED RESERVATION SYSTEMS
BY THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY

by

f

TAKAKO TAYAMA LUTZ

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements of the
Campus Honors Program
St. Petersburg Campus
University of South Florida

August 1994

Thesis Advisor: A.J. Waltz, Ph.D.

_ ..___

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. Introduction . .. .. ..... ... .. .. ...... ... .... ....... .. ....... .. .. ... .... . .... .. .. .. .. ........ ... . .. ....... .... .. .. ... . 1
II. Information Technology . .. . ...... .. ...... .. .. ....... ... ........ ... . ..... ....... ...... .. . ..... ... .... 4
a. The Definition of Information Technology . . . . .. ... ....... .. ... .. ... .. .. .
b. History of the Development of Information Technology ...
c. The Role of Information Technology . .. .. ...... ... ..... ... ... .. .. . ... . . ... ... ..
d. Summary of Information Technology .......... ... ... ..... ..... ........ ... ...

5
5
8
9

ill. Business Decisions ...................................................................................... 1 0

a. "Mak"
e or "Buy " ................................................................................. . 10
b. Analysis of Competitiveness ......................................................... 1 0
IV. The Airline Industry and Government Regulation

........ .. ............ 1 2

V. The Airline Industry and the Impact of the CRSs ......... ................. 14
a. Creation of the CRS .. .. ..... .... ...... .. .... .. .. . ......... ......... .. ...... .... .. .. ...........
b. Failure of the Uniform CRS ............................................... ...... .. ....
c. Agency Automation and Co-host ................................................
d. CRSs Generated Revenues Other than by Ticket Sales .....
e. The Analysis of the Five Competitive Forces ........................
f. Government Intervention ..............................................................
g. Future Direction of CRSs .. ....... ....... .... ........ .. .. .. ........ ..... ....... ......... ..

16
19
22
24
25
29
32

VI. Conclusion ... ... ... .. ..... .. .. ... ... ........ ... .. .. ...... ...... .... .... ...... ... ... ........ .. . ............ ... .. . 3 7
Appendix ........ ...... ...... .. ... ... ... ..... .......... ......... .. .... .... .... ... ... ... .... ....... ....... ... ..... ... . ... 3 8
References ............................................................................................................. 4 2

ABSTRACT

Information technology has grown to be a critical factor in the
success of any type and size of business.

It supports data processing,

managers' decision making, and strategic operations of the business.
The airline industry, among others, is known for its strategic
use of information technology.

The airline companies devoted their

information technology efforts to creating and improving their
computerized reservation systems (CRSs).
This thesis examines the impact of CRSs on the airline industry:
how the CRS-pioneering airlines gained strategic advantage over
other airlines.

It shows that information technology through CRSs

has been a major success factor for airline companies.

I. INTRODUCTION

For those who have traveled by air within the last 16 years, it may
appear that the airline and travel industries have not changed much.

When

one calls or visits a travel agent for flight tickets, one does not doubt that one
will receive an itinerary before saying "good-bye" to the agent.

This rarely

happened prior to the existence of computerized reservation systems (CRSs) .
In that time, airline reservations were processed manually, and completing an
itinerary could take hours ("SABRE-real," 1981).
The CRSs resulted from the airlines' efforts to utilize information
technology.

The airline industry was among the first groups to realize the

significant advantage and the impact of information technology on their
business.

As available technology could not satisfy the airlines' needs for

building an adequate CRS, the airlines pioneered the development of
information technology that enabled them to build CRSs.

They took

entrepreneurial risks and committed considerable time, money, and effort on
the CRS projects (Belden, 1978; "SABRE-real," 1981).
Because travelers could expect fast and accurate itineraries, the airline
companies with CRSs successfully increased their market share, and soon the
whole industry began to desire an industrywide CRS.

Many airlines gathered

from time to time to discuss the creation of a uniform system that would offer
booking agents flight information on behalf of all airlines.

Although this

would have been ideal for travel agents and airlines that did not own a CRS, the
government was concerned about competitive and anti-trust activities, as the
systems would have shared the inside information of all airlines (Computer
Reservation, 1985, p. 83).
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Early in 1976, in the midst of this turmoil, the two airlines with
successful CRSs began to market their systems to travel agencies (Computer
Reservation, 1985, p. 85; "Computer Rescue," 1990).

This showed the requisite

level of the CRS owners' confidence in their systems and in the information
technology capacities.

While the CRSs increased in complexity as numerous

computers at travel agencies had to interact with an integrated information
system from remote sites and the databases incorporated a large amount of
flight information of non-owner airlines, their owners had to improve the
useability of their systems for their new, less skilled users:

the travel agents

who brought a majority of ticket sales to the CRS owners.
As those owners programmed their CRSs to favor their own airlines
over other airlines whose flight schedules were also available on the systems,
the other airlines experienced some unfairness in the CRS operation.
unfairness continued, they asked the government to take action.
CRS owners practiced some bias against other airlines.

As this

Indeed the

While the government

could not prove that the CRS owners used their CRSs in an anti-competitive
manner, the owners eliminated some of these biased practices in response to
the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) rules of 1985 (Computer Reservation, 1985, P.
26).

Now that several CRSs have been competing with each other for the
market, the owners are considering expenses for maintenance and
improvements of the CRSs.

They have begun to seek co-ownership of their

systems in order to share these expenses.

As the airline industry has grown

from a domestic to an international focus and the domestic CRS market has
reached saturation, the merger activities have extended beyond the domestic
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CRSs.

The domestic CRS owners have been actively seeking agreements with

foreign CRS owners (Bartimo, Payne, & Ellis, 1990).
With the help of new information technology, the major CRS owners
have offered other means of making flight reservations.

Now companies and

individuals with access to on-line information services can make their own
reservations from their personal computers (PCs), although the travel agents
still must issue the tickets (Eckerson, 1993; Wheeler, 1987).

With the adoption

of distributed 1 information technology by the airline industry, tickets may be
sent electronically to a remote site and printed where the traveler stays (Fotos,
1992).

1Distributed: information processing activities in a company are
accomplished by a network of computers instead of relying on one
large centralized computer facility or on the decentralized operations
of several independent computers. O'Brien, 1993 , p.190.
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II. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

The following introduction to information technology will be necessary
to appreciate fully the impact of CRSs on the airline industry.

The rapidly

growing information technology influences all sizes and types of business.

It

evolved from merely a tool for data processing to the companies' fundamental
system.

A company and a department must go through several stages to

mature in the development and implementation of information technology.
The time it takes to experience each stage of information technology and the
large investment that information technology requires often separates the
information "haves" and "have-nots" (Alter, 1992, p. 599).
The application of information technology to business has g r ow n
rapidly.

Most top executives have begun to realize the importance of rea dil y

available information and the need to manage. plan, protect, and treat
information as any other resource:

such as capital, faciliti es, personnel , or

raw materials (McFadden & Hoffer, 1991, p. 709).

Astute managers who realize

the importance of information and will shift their attention from systems to
information (Hopper, 1990).

Thi s "information resource management" is

critical for a company to stay competitive in the information age.

In many

cases, whether or not a company takes advantage of informati on

techn olo gy

and successfully manages its information resources decides its destiny.

~~1
l~y;
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a.

The

Definition

of

Information

Technology

Information technology represents a broad range of interacting
domains.

It includes technologies of computer hardware and software,

telecommunications, database management, and office automation that
perform data processing tasks such as capturing, transmitting. storing,
retrieving, manipulating. or displaying data (Alter, 1992, p.9; O'Brien. 1993, p.
12; Cash. McFarlan, McKenney & Applegate, 1992. p . .l).

It has created new

departments, called for massive recruiting of new types of staff, and required
major investments in computer hardware and software nationwide (Cash.
McFarlan, McKenney & Applegate, 1992. p. 1) .
applied to any size of business.

Information technology may be

The information made available by this

technology has affected how a company operates and competes.

b.

History

of

the

Development

of

Information

Technology

Although information technology is relatively a young field, it has
gone through several stages since its first appearance in business in the
1950s.

These stages include data processing, management information systems,

decision support systems, and strategic and end user support.

The emphasis of

each stage has shifted from data, to information, and then to knowledge2.

2The term "data" refers to raw facts, measures, names, and codes
concerning people, objects, events, or other entities. Information is
the meaning of data; data that have been processed and presented
in a form suitable for human interpretation, often with the purpose

.._
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The first stage--electronic data processing (EDP)--emphasized data
processing.

This type of information technology improved efficiency and

helped companies save money.

From the 1950s to the 1960s, information

technology handled simple tasks such as transaction processing, record
keeping,

and

accounting.

The next two stages--management information systems and decision
support systems--began to recognize the importance of information from
processed data.

A major investment of time and money was devoted to the

development and improvement of information technology at this time.

From

the 1960s to the 1970s, the technology helped generate management reports
from a variety of information sources.
decision-making.

The companies used the reports for

From the 1970s to the 1980s, the role of information

technology in decision-making became more extensive.

It included the ad hoc

and interactive support of the management decision-making process.

The

concept of decision support systems (DSS) was born at this time.
The latest and still-evolving stage includes strategic and end · u::rer
support systems.

This stage began in the 1980's.

technology began to provide knowledge.
branches:

At this time information

This stage is divided into four

end user computing, executive information systems, expert systems,

and strategic information systems.
information instead of using it.

The first two branches provided
The last two branches used information to

provide knowledge generated from information.

This resulted from the major

commitment of resources during the previous stages.

of revealing trends or patterns. Knowledge indicates what to do
about information which implies action. McFedden & Hoffer, 1991, p.
5; Data Base, 1993.
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The first branch, end user computing systems, provides users with
computing resources to perform their jobs and allowed them more
independence.

The second branch, executive information systems (EIS),

permits top executives to get critical information they want, when they want
it, and tailored to the formats they prefer.

The third branch is expert systems.

With information stored in the system, they perform diagnoses and serve as
consultants to users by providing expert knowledge.

The final branch,

strategic information systems, enables information to become a part, if not all ,
of the products and services offered.
strategic objective of a company.

They play a direct role in achieving the

All of these branches work together to

enable a company to compete strategically (O'Brien, 1993, p.37).
Studies show that a company or a department cannot start its
information technology activities from the state-of-the-art level.

It must

evolve through the stages discussed above and experience each technology
before it can utilize information technology competitively.
referred to as "Nolan's theory."

This will be later

This fact makes a wide difference between the

technology "haves" and "have-nots."

When a have-not tries to become a have,

it must spend adequate time experiencing the technology at each stage and

provide the necessary funding that is usually a large amount of money.
meantime, the haves use their time and money to improve themselves.

In the
The

time required to catch up with the haves makes it difficult for the have-not to
compete in the information technology market (Alter, 1992, p . 599).
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c.

The

Role

of

Information

Technology

Although the four stages of information technology have been
discussed chronologically, all stages are still in use today.

Information

technology supports business operations, managerial decision making, and
strategic advantage.

Business operations process business transactions

efficiently, control industrial processes, support office communications and
productivity, and update corporate databases (O'Brien, 1993, p. 38).

In

managerial decision making, information systems generate reports on
demand, periodically, and on exceptional conditions; provide information in
an interactive session on an ad hoc (as needed) basis; and provide tailored
information needs of top management often with graphic display (p . 41-43 ).
Strategic information systems can help a company promote organizational
innovation and build strategic information technology resources.

For any

bank, an innovation such as automated teller machines (A TMs) brought new
business opportunities and expanded its market share, and the development of
ATMs was an extension of information technology in teller terminal networks
(p. 48, 50-52).

Some large companies utilize all three, emphasizing the

strategic use of information technology.

In contrast, some small businesses

use information technology to support only their business operation and do
not utilize information technology as a support of strategic advantage.
The ultimate role of information technology is to "help organizations
solve critical business problems or deliver new services by collecting data,
turning data into information, and turning information into knowledge
quickly enough to reflect the time value of knowledge" (Hopper, 1990).
superior product design, marketing , customer service, or distribution

Where
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channels help gain competitive advantage, a company uses information
technology to help its product gain a competitive advantage over its rivals'
products.

A product wins when a customer values the product more than its

rivals at the same price or when the product offers the same value as other
products at the lower price (Alter, 1992, p. 11).

d.

Summary

of

Information

Technology

As information technology changed the way businesses operated, it
created new departments, required new types of staff and computer hardware
and software.

The history of the development of information technology

reveals how the functions and importance of information technology has
changed over the years.

It started as a data processing tool, then it became a

tool to provide information that supported managers in decision making, and
finally companies started to use the knowledge from information strategically.
Because companies and departments lie in different stages of development, all
of the different technologies discussed above still exist today.

L__
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III. BUSINESS CONCERNS

a. "Make" or "Buy"
When a company needs to acquire a new system or to update an existing
one, it is an important initial decision for that company to determine whether
to make or to buy a system.

A company considers a "make" decision when a

system is unique, the company wishes to maintain confidentiality of the
system, and the business is expected to grow rapidly, thus requiring it to adapt
to new systems in the near future.

On the other hand, a company considers a

"buy" decision when specialized skills are available by "outsourcing" and its
financial resources are limited (Cash, McFrian, McKenny & Applegate, 1992, p.
46).

No matter which decision a company makes, development and

implementation of information technology are not always successful.

The risk

becomes higher when a project requires both the use of new technology
unfamiliar to a company and a large investment.

The risk also increases with

insufficient planning. (Alter, 1992, p. 17; Cash, McFarlan, McKenney &
Applegate, 1992, p.104).

b.

Analysis

of

Competitiveness

Analyzing a company's surrounding environment in a particular
industry permits company and industry analysts to evaluate how strongly the
company stands in the industry and what it ought to do to enhance its
performance.
competitiveness.

Generally, a company encounters five forces that threaten its
These include:

competition within the industry, buyers'
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bargaining power, suppliers' bargaining power, threat of new entrants, and
threat of substitute products (see Figure 1) (Hunger & Wheeler, 1993, p. 100).
To survive and succeed in the business , a company must handle these
forces well .

It tries to minimize threats by exercising the following:

locking

out competitors by locking in buyers and suppliers, attracting new customers,
locking in present buyers as well as suppliers by creating switching costs
(making it expensive for buyers and suppliers to change their business
partner from that company to its competitor) , blocking new entrants by
making entry investments unattractively large, and making

substitution

unattractive to buyers by promoting its own features that the substitution
cannot offer (O'Brien, 1993, p. 48).

;sh
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JV. THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION

Like any other transportation industry, the airline industry has faced
governmental regulation. The regulation of the airline industry began with
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (Securities and Exchange, 1992, p. 2).

It

remained under regulation for 40 years until the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978.

Those who supported the Deregulation Act hoped to create more price

and service choices for passengers through greater competition.

Some

thought that deregulation would succeed, arguing that the airline industry
would become competitive and efficient, that more airlines would freely enter
the market and would operate at economies of scale.

Others thought that

deregulation would fail claiming that it would become less competitive with a
few dominating airlines (Fawcett & Farris, 1989).
The success of deregulation depends on one's perception.
had been dominating the airline industry.
have strong positions in the industry.

The Big Five

The top three of which even now

On the other hand, little airline

companies, such as SouthWest Airlines, have had a strong influence, driving
the industry to a different way of operation.

These airlines generally offer

one low price with no reservation required, but these low prices come with no
services.

They do not offer meals or connecting flights, and they often depart

from and arrive at not-so-popular (and less expensive) airports.

The major

airlines have been forced to cut costs and offer special rates to compete, while
maintaining an adequate level of services.
Prior to the deregulation in 1978, the airline companies had to submit
proposed rates and route changes to the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), an
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independent agency that regulated the airline companies, for approval.

While

some airlines favored the deregulation, most airlines and the airline labor
unions strongly opposed it.

Employees of small airlines feared that they might

lose their jobs as major airlines drove their small airlines out of business.

To

accommodate this possibility, Congress established a fund for employees who
might lose their jobs as a result of deregulation (Airline Deregulation, 1981,
p.331).
The Act meant to phase out federal controls on the airline industry over
a seven-year period.

The deregulation occurred in three stages.

By the end of

1981, the restrictions on entry into domestic airline markets were eliminated.
On January 1, 1983, pricing became free.
airline industry became free from CAB.

Finally, on January 1, 1985, the
The remaining functions of the CAB

were transferred to the Department of Transportation (DOT) (Securities and
Exchange, 1992, p. 3).
As a reaction to the deregulation, ticket prices initially fell, as the
airlines began to compete with each other to acquire new business.
the increase in fuel costs soon drove ticket prices up again.

However,

The surviving

airlines experienced substantial losses in 1980 (Airline Deregulation, 1981, p.
868).

Although the industry has been deregulated, the government still

exercises a strong influence over the industry.
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V. THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY AND THE IMPACT OF THE CRS

The airline industry has been at the cutting edge of information
technology with major efforts in the development and the improvement of
computerized reservation systems (CRSs).

When first built in the 1960s and the

1970s by American Airlines and United Airlines, the systems served as internal
systems used to facilitate individual airline's business needs such as
maintaining seat inventory.

A CRS, then, contained a developer airline's

schedules, fares, and seat information only ("SABRE-real," 1981).
When CRSs became available to travel agents in 1976, the CRSs improved
considerably.

The more new technology was developed, the better and larger

the CRSs became.

The modern CRSs, in contrast to the early CRSs, have become

external systems connected to as many as 750 airlines.

They maintain up-to-

the-minute data for as many as 45 million airfares (600,000 of which change
daily), 26,000 hotels and 40 car rental companies (Eckerson, 1993; Knight, 1991;
McCarroll, 1989).
CRSs demand information technology and technological innovation.
When new technology became available, the airlines quickly implemented it
into their systems.

Information technology regarding production

(concerning costs, coping with complexity, coordination, and integration) and
marketing

(concerning reaction to change provision of differentiation)

affects the airline industry more than other industries (see Figure 2).
airlines, American and United mark high (see Figure 3).

Among

Unlike the pioneer

airlines, the other airlines failed to commit their time and money to build their
own CRSs.

Consequently they have been unable to produce a cost-effective
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CRS (production) or to differentiate their services to buyers (marketing).
CRSs remain the critical factor in the success of the airline companies and
therefore receive considerable attention (Cash, McFarlan, McKenney &
Applegate, 1992, pp. 35-36, 39).
When the development started, the online3 and distributed technology
was very new.

The pioneer airlines spent from $250 million to $350 million to

develop their CRSs (Frenzel, 1991 , p. 47).

The new technology and the

resulting large investment made the CRS projects very risky.

However, the

airline companies took the risks, and invested the time and money to develop
their CRSs, and the CRS projects returned more than they hoped for.

Because

not every airline and travel agency could afford to develop a CRS by itself,
they began to purchase the use of existing systems.
practice to book flights through CRSs.

It became the standard

Airlines and travel agencies had to

have a CRS to stay in business.
As usage of CRSs increased, competitive advantages of the haves over
the have-nots became substantial.
how their systems operated.

The CRS owners held powerful control over

Ironically, the technology that helped make

travelers' lives much easier became the object of many lawsuits.

As the

pioneer airlines gained considerable competitive advantage over other
airlines, the other airlines began to complain that the controlling power of
the pioneer airlines over their CRSs damaged their businesses.

The other

airlines realized that it was too late to develop a competitive CRS equal the
existing CRSs, given the time and money needed to adapt the technology and

3 Online: data are processed immediately after a transaction occurs
instead of accumulating data over a period of time and processing
these periodically. O'Brien, 1993 , p. 308.
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the established market share of the existing CRSs, but did not wish to let the
pioneer airlines retain their power.

As a last resort, the other airlines

appealed to the government for "fair access" to the CRSs.
From the pioneer airlines' point of view, the revenues that their CRSs
generated were a reward for the effort and money they spent and the risks
they took to develop their CRSs.
them as they wished.

They claimed that they were entitled to use

For others, the biased usage of the systems imposed by

the CRS-owner airlines was unfair.

They claimed that every participant in the

market should have fair access to the systems (Computer Reservation, 1985, p.
97).
In order to understand both the CRS owners' and others' standpoints, the
development of the CRSs, the power of the owner airlines in the industry, and
the way the systems have been operated require examination.

a. Creation of the CRS

In the 1950s the two largest domestic airlines, American and United4,

began to realize the need for reservation automation and integration of
various information.
analyze its feasibility.

As this involved new technology, it took several years to
In return, when they developed and implemented their

CRSs, not only did they increase their ticket sales, but they also gained several

4united was the largest airline until November 1988 when American
replaced it in the number one position. Bradsher, 1990, p. 11.
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years of competitive advantage in information technology experience over
the rest of the industry ("SABRE-real," 1981).
The first CRS was born in the early 1960s when it became impossible to
handle the volume of reservations with index cards and blackboards.

In

October 1959, after a five-year preliminary analysis and design study,
American signed a contract wilh lnternalional Business Machines (IBM) to
develop the first realtime (so-called online, up-to-the-minute) system in the
commercial world.

The CRS installation began in 1960 ("SABRE-real," 1981).

Its predecessor was the US Air Force's Semi-Automatic Ground
Environment, SAGE, which protected the U.S. against a surprise air attack
("SABRE-real," 1981).

It consisted of a network of 16 radar-fed computers that

continuously analyzed every cubic foot of airspace around the country's
perimeter.

American not only learned about the on-line system from SAGE but

also used the hardware designed for SAGE.
SABRE:

Its CRS

(

received the acronym

Semi-Automated Business Research Environment ("Air Wars," 1986).

l

~
t:

The SABRE project sought to solve the airlines' problems in passenger
sales, seat inventory, and maintaining and retrieving passenger records.

This

first airline reservation system integrated two basic reservation records:

the

passenger name record and the seat inventory.

The operations that travelers

now take for granted, such as "realtime" seat inventory and receiving
boarding passes for connecting and return flights , became a reality through
SABRE.

Every time a customer changed or canceled on a seat, it was recorded

immediately so that a reservation agent could tell exactly how many seats were
available and who had a reservation ("SABRE-real," 1981).
For years before the CRS ,

reservation offices had kept these records on

cards and maintained them manually, and each office controlled seat

----

'
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inventories for flights originating in its city.

A domestic round-trip

reservation would take two or three hours to complete.

By 1955, computers

kept seat inventories, and an agent could check seat availability instantly.

But

posting a passenger name, telephone number, and other information required
tremendous paperwork.

For every agent on the phone, another did the

processing and record keeping in the back room.

By 1965 the SABRE project,

which took 400 man-years and $30 million to complete, saved at least 30% of its
investments
savings alone.

in reservation operating

expenses

annually through

staff

At the completion of SABRE in 1964, American positioned itself

five to seven years ahead of the other airlines in experience and application
technology ("SABRE-real," 1981; Stamper, 1991, pp. 5, 10-11).
In contrast to American, United did not have to depend on an outside
systems design and application development.

In the 1960s, they had a division

that already successfully supplied those services on a commercial basis.

But

then the division began to have some concerns and problems:

While [the division] could
satisfactorily, meeting the
external customers as well
management talent, which
disadvantage.

handle [its] own business quite
same demand growth curve of
put a serious strain on
would ultimately be to our

Then there was the problem of reconciling peaks
and troughs in outside customers' business with United's
own peaks and troughs. Too much coincidence between
the two (as was likely to happen when other airlines were
being serviced) meant violent swings in staffing
requirements and sometimes a shortage of adequately
qualified staff in [the division's] computer centers (Belden,
1978).

United also foresaw the rapid growth of dependence on information
systems in the airline business.

It realized that to stay as a leading airline it
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needed a new reservation system with larger capacity and new and better
features.

No such products were available.

In the early seventies, United had

to decide whether it would remain as one of the many customers of its
computer division, or the computer division would serve solely United's
technical needs .

As it set airline customer satisfaction as its first priority,

United generally decreased outside business so it could devote its information
effort into developing a system.

This decision created its CRS, Apollo

Automated Sales (Belden, 1978).
As discussed earlier, a business must decide whether make or buy its
system.

Both airlines made a make decision.

these make decisions.

Several factors contributed to the

First, the products were unique.

the-art technology that was not widely available.

They required state-of-

Second, as the developers of

a new type of system, they probably wished to keep the technology and the
process of making a CRS secret.

Third, as the airlines anticipated the rapid

change of information technology, developing a CRS would be easier without

tr~

l~
·~ t

having to coordinate the requirements with technology providers.

Due to the

absence of required products, skills, and knowledge in the market place, the

t ' -·

~=~
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buy decision could not have been feasible.

.J
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b. Failure of the Uniform CRS

. ~

. ~

In the mid 1960s, as the airline industry began to realize the importance
and usefulness of CRSs, airlines made an effort to develop a common CRS.
first effort started in 1967 with 21 airlines .

The

The proposed system was called

Donnelly Official Airlines Reservations Systems (DOARS).

This project was
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soon abandoned, because of an inadequate level of automation in the plan.
This system would have contained only the flight schedules that were then on
paper (Computer Reservation, 1985, pp. 82-83).
The second attempt began in 1969.

Several airlines asked the CAB to

approve their project called Automated Travel Agency Reservations System
(ATARS).

ATARS would have provided travel agents with information and

service on behalf of all airlines.

The CAB instituted an investigation because

of its concerns about competitive issues in regard to a uniform system.

Before

the CAB completed the review, the participants were discouraged by the
government's opposition and abandoned the project (Computer Reservation,
1985, pp. 82-83).
The third attempt began in 1974.

American organized discussions

among airlines, computer vendors, travel agents, and commercial accounts.
The proposed system was called Joint Industry Computerized Reservations
System (JICRS).

JICRS would have provided travel agents with reservations

and ticketing services on behalf of all airlines through one central site
computer.

The CAB interrupted the project by noting that its competitive

concerns from the second attempt must be cleared before it gave final
approval (Computer Reservation, 1985, pp. 82-83).
United realized that the attempts to create a uniform system threatened
its competitive advantage.

In 1976, in the middle of the third attempt, United

announced that it would extend its Apollo system to travel agencies.
followed suit on the very next day.

American

United explained that the move to offer its

CRS to travel agents was unavoidable because of the growing need for
automated reservation systems in the travel industry and the disintegration of
the attempt to create a universal system (Computer Reservation, 1985, p. 98).
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Also, United expected that distributing its in-house system would be easier and
cost less than joining the project ("Computer rescue," 1980).

American could

not let its major competitor go ahead of it (Computer Reservation, 1985, p. 83).
Making their CRSs available to the industry constituted a revolutionary
event.

The formation of today's airline and travel industries began at this

point.

The CRSs automated offices of travel agencies and made information

available to them .

Agents could book flights within five minutes while still on

the phone with a customer.
Even after the two CRSs entered the travel agents' market, a group of
travel agents, ten airlines and American Express gathered to develop an
industry-wide airline reservation system.

They agreed to establish a nonprofit

corporation for the development of "multiple-access" reservations system
(MARS) .

In the midst of a two-year analysis, the airlines withdrew from the

project because a uniform system that required inside information from all
the participants would lead to antitrust action (Computer Reservation, 1985, pp.
83, 98).

While travel agents still wanted a uniform system, United and

American improved and added more features to their systems to satisfy travel
agents with their systems.

Also, travel agents could not have competed with

the rapid improvement of the CRSs by the experienced airlines ("Computer
rescue,"

1980).

If a uniform system had become a reality, the airline industry would

have been a more peaceful one.

It would have avoided lawsuits alleging CRSs'

biased practices and would have saved the resulting tremendous expenditure
of money and time.

However, at the same time, the technology development

would have been considerably slower, since competitive motivation would not
have existed.

American argued that without competition the efficiency of CRSs
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would be lessened and fewer travel agents would be automated (Computer
Reservation, 1985, p.83).

The uniform CRS would have lined up every airline

at the same competitive stage.

From the pioneer airlines' point of view, after

all the major expenditures, time requirements, and the risks they took to
develop their CRSs, this would be unfair.

c.

Agency

Automation

and

Co-host

As SABRE and Apollo became available to the external world in 1976,
American and United experienced a major transition.

Because travel agencies

could not afford to buy a CRS for each airline, and most other airlines did not
have a CRS, the existing CRSs began to provide information about other
airlines to travel agents ("Airline Reservation," 1985).
internal systems to external systems.

The CRSs evolved from

The CRS owners had to satisfy not only

the internal needs but also the external requirements and demands.

Because,

for most travel agents, the CRSs were their first exposure to automation, the
CRS owners had to make their systems easier to use.

They spent more than

$500 million on CRS improvement to satisfy the needs of the travel agents ("Do
Airlines," 1983).

As CRSs share other airlines' schedules, a phenomenon called

'co-hosting' appeared.

Small airlines that cannot afford to develop a CRS on

their own can, for a fee, gain market exposure and access to a wide network by
co-hosting a major CRS. At the same time, the host airlines can make its CRS
more marketable to travel agents by having more schedules from the other
airlines ("Airline Reservation," 1985; Computer Reservation, 1985).
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The impact of travel agencies on ticket sales grew as the usage of CRSs
increased.

As more and more travel agencies automated their offices, travel

agents' tickets sales through CRSs became the rule.

Just as a CRS became a

requirement for airlines to stay competitive, the travel agency needed one as
well.

The travel agencies needed automation and readily accessible

information to serve customers more quickly and more accurately than other
travel

agencies .
Without a CRS, a travel agent could spend as much as 44% of his time on

clerical work.

This was especially true after the deregulation that generated

the complication of promotional items such as tour packages.
saved by using a CRS, the agent could sell more.

With the time

For example, a travel agency

that installed the Apollo system increased its ticket sales by 60%.

Another

travel agency with SABRE reported that it tripled its ticket sales in the first
three years after installation ("Computer Rescue," 1980).

Generally, a CRS

boosted a travel agency's business by 20 to 30% ("American Rediscovers ," 1982;
Gillin, 1982).
Although travel agents were pleased with their sales increases thanks
to their CRSs, they always longed to have a better system: a uniform, unbiased
system.

The CRSs had biased features favoring the owner airlines by

displaying their own flights before those of other airlines.

The CRS owners

hoped that travel agents would make reservations on their flights that
appeared on the first screen.

However, when a customer wants a particular

airline which is not American or United, the booking could take some time
scrolling down to the bottom of the records.

Another unpleasant factor was

that it could take up to three weeks for a host airline to update other airlines'
schedules while the owners updated theirs immediately.

This situation could
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result in the reservation of a seat which has already been sold.

Moreover, the

system would not let a travel agent sell the last four seats available.
airline offices could sell the last seats.

Only the

Finally, American and United would not

offer its system to an agency that generated less than $1 million annually in
airline ticket sales.

United justified this action by saying that, "There was

simply a greater demand than we could respond to" ("Computer Rescue,"

1980).

Coincidentally, a larger travel agency could produce greater fees for the CRS

'

owner.

)
I

d. CRSs Generated Revenues Other Than By Ticket Sales

I,

I'
t'

Because providing the CRSs to the travel agents benefits the host
airlines in terms of increased ticket sales and increased revenues from the
usage fees, it has become very critical for airline companies to sell their own
CRSs to travel agents (Belitsos, 1988).

Statistically, travel agents tend to book

the host airlines flights more than those of co-hosts, although the CRS owners
claimed to have removed these biases.

This tendency is called the "halo" effect.

The General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated that incremental bookings
increase CRS-owner airlines' revenues by as much as 40% (Proctor, 1988).

l

I

A host airline can generate its revenue not only through travel agents
that bring sales and pay fees for their usage, but also through other airlines,
or co-hosts, that pay fees for tickets sold through its CRS.

SABRE, for example,

charges co-hosts 27¢ to 94¢ per each flight segment booked through it
("American Rediscovers," 1982).
competitiveness with a host airline.

The charges depend on the co-host airline's
If the airline does not appear to be a
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threat to the host, the "monopoly price" might be 25¢, but direct competitors
might pay as much as $6 a ticket (Banks, 1983).
The battle between competing airline companies to improve and sell
CRSs intensified as they learned what CRSs could bring for them.

The

operation of CRSs has become an industry by itself, and a profitable one
("Computer Reservation," 1988; Brandley & Smith, 1988).
posted losses, the CRSs continued to bring profit.
accounted for 85 % of American's earnings.

While the airlines

For example, SABRE

While the CRSs' overall profit

margin marks 20-25%, the airlines have 8-10% (Belitsos, 1988).
the deciding factor for the success in the industry.

CRSs remain as

Even though co-host

airlines were aware that the host airlines used their CRSs for their advantage,
they did not have any control over the operation of the CRSs.

They had either

to pay the fees or withdraw their co-hosting agreement and lose the flight
reservations made through travel agencies with the CRS.

Those airlines with a

CRS are "the big eagles" , while those without one are "sitting ducks"
(McCarroll, 1989).

e.

The

Analysis of the Five

Competitive Forces

I

I

After discussing how the CRSs originated and how the CRS business
practice operated, evaluating SABRE and Apollo in the light of the five forces
(competition within the industry , buyers ' bargaining power, suppliers'
bargaining power, the threat of new entrants, and the threat of substitute

I
r

products) will reveal how competitive they became.
identifying the forces in the CRS industry.

The process begins with

Competition within the industry is
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II

among existing CRSs.

The buyers are the travel agents.

American and United themselves.

The suppliers are

New entrants would be an industry-wide

uniform CRS, other airlines' new CRSs, and any CRS that combined existing
CRSs.

Substitute products would be a new method of making a reservation

other than through the use of computer systems (see Figure 1).
At the peak of the CRS market share battle in the mid-1980s, five CRSs

I

competed with each other:

American's SABRE, United's Apollo, TWA's PARS,

Eastern's and Continental's (Texas Air's) SystemOne, and Delta's DATAS II
(Beletsos, 1988).

II'

They tried to attract travel agents and lock them in by

offering better services, better commission rates and discounted fees (Bartimo,
Payne, Hawkins & Ellis, 1990).

Although the five CRSs existed at the same time,

according to Nolan's theory, the former two and the latter three stood at the
different stages of growth in using information technology.
airlines fell well behind the former two.

The latter three

Having existed in the market longer

than other CRSs, SABRE and Apollo can gain product differentiation with their
skills and experience by quickly offering a variety of specialized services.
Another factor to be considered is the size of the owner airlines.

As long as

American and United stay dominant in the flight business they will stay
dominant in the CRS industry as well because travel agencies tend to use a CRS
whose owner airline is a major player in the airline business in that areaS.
The airlines have tried to control buyers ' bargaining power by having
travel agencies sign a restrictive contract.

A CRS contract generally contains

5 The growing market shares of SystemOne and Pars should be noted
here. By 1988, SystemOne and Pars had gained travel agency
market of 18% and 14.5%, respectively, while Sabre had 34% and
United had 24.5% of market shares. Belitsos, 1988, p. 38.

(' 1J
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a clause that makes travel agents pay for breaking it.

When a travel agency

decides to terminate its contract with a CRS owner to convert to a rival's CRS, it
must pay the owner the cost of moving the equipment and for the lost
equipment-rental fees (fees paid for the equipment's idle time) .

In an

additional agreement called "liquidation damages ," the travel agency must pay
for the estimated value of the booking fees that the host airline could have
charged to rival airlines .

At a large travel agency in particular, the costs of

terminating a CRS contract can be millions (Belitsos, 1988).

These high

switching costs make it difficult for travel agents to bargain (Hunger &
Wheeler, 1991, p. 101).

However, when a different airline from the current

CRS owner becomes dominant in a particular area, a travel agency in that area
is better off changing the CRSs to the dominant airline's, in spite of the large
costs, in order to get competitive advantage (Belitsos, 1988).
As the airlines themselves are suppliers of the CRSs, they can exclude
the threat of suppliers' bargaining power out of the five competitive forces.
They do not need to consider about dealing with this particular threat.
They had already combatted the threat of the new entrant once before
when they offered their CRS to travel agencies in 1976, which interrupted the
process of creating a uniform system.
emerged since then.

No plan for creating such a system has

Unless the government imposes the development of such

a system, time is running out for a uniform system to catch up with the
existing CRSs.
Since the travel agency market opened, the pioneer airlines have
successfully minimized the threat of new CRSs' entry by building barriers to
entry.

Entering the CRS market requires a large amount of capital and time to

develop a CRS , as well as the difficulty in gaining access to marketing
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channels after developing one.

The dominant CRSs have enjoyed economies of

scale: they remain large enough to generate low unit costs with which a new
entrant can hardly compete.

They have gained product differentiation:

some

travel agents have become loyal to their CRSs as they became familiar with it
as their first CRS.

Non-CRS owner airlines know that it is more cost effective

to become a co-host of an existing CRS than to develop one for themselves and
market it where other CRSs have already established their markets (Hunger &
Wheeler, 1993, pp. 100-101).
Although the chances are slim that a new CRS--an industry wide or a
particular airline's--will be built, CRS owners must take care not to overlook
the possible merger activities.

As discussed later, the CRS owners became

aware of the benefits of combining their CRSs with someone else's.

Although

SABRE and Apollo have kept their top CRS market shares, this would not be
true if two or more modest sized CRSs were combined.

In fact, one combined

CRS, WorldSpan, has come close to Apollo's market share.

By appealing to the

U.S. government to block the activity on anti-trust grounds this type of joint
venture can be avoided.
The last threat comes from substitute products.
virtually non-existent.

Again, this threat is

Although a manual process could make airline

reservations, air travelers who are too accustomed to automation would not
endure a manual reservation process.

Some sort of automation innovation that

excludes use of computer technology must occur before this force becomes a
threat.

29
f.

Government

Intervention

As the analysis of the five competitive forces showed, SABRE and Apollo
dominate the CRS industry.

They had allegedly exercised biased practices.

The

non-CRS-owner airlines began to appeal to the government hoping it would
equalize the competition and make charging the fees illegal ("Airline
Reservation," 1985).

As pressures from these airlines became greater, the

government stepped into the CRS market to examine the alleged biases and
American's and United's monopoly power.

The purpose of the inquiry,

according to the DOT, was to promote entry and competition in the CRS market.
By reducing the monopolistic power of American and United, the Department
wanted to see economic efficiency.

Congress even suggested limits on booking

and related travel agency fees as well as mandatory divestiture or the creation
of a uniform CRS (Proctor, 1988).
Among biases practiced by the host airlines, the major one was the
display bias.

Travel agents can view six or eight lines of flight schedules on a

screen at a time.

Because more than 75% (some estimates 90%) of all flight

bookings are made off the first set of flight schedules, the host airlines try to
get their schedules on the first screen ("American Rediscovers," 1982; Banks,
1983).

A co-hosting airline can pay a higher fee for a better screen position,

although the fee does not guarantee it ("Airline Reservation," 1985).
Different industries use this type of eye-catching method as well.

In

the retail industry, for example, store clerks deliberately place higher profit
products at eye-level position hoping customers pick them as opposed to other
lower profit ones.

This concept resulted in exactly what the host airlines

intended ("Airline Reservation," 1985).
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Examples of other abuses are:

refusing to list competitors' fares and

schedules, censoring messages of competitors, and calling competitors'
passengers to try to divert them (Computer Reservation, 1985, p. 29).

If a

connection to a flight is necessary, a CRS listed flight schedules that went
through the host airline's hub before its competitors' ("Airline Reservation,"
1985).

The biased CRSs sometimes delayed competitors' current flight

information so travel agents feared to trust the appearing information and
make a reservation, which forced travel agents to book the host airline's
flights.

If travel agents must call competing airlines to make sure of the

schedule, it will require them 25% more time.
did this deliberately (Gillin, 1982).

Host airlines denied that they

Another example is that when an agent

asked Apollo for flight schedules it would show its own and its co-host's airline
flights after the requested departure time and only United's flights before the
time ("American Rediscovers," 1982).

I

The host airlines also enjoy the availability of up-to-the-second
information with which they can take action in a timely manner.

Having

access to realtime based CRSs, American and United have great advantages.

I

The airlines can update flight schedules and change prices immediately in
reaction to any changes made by other airlines.
not have these luxuries;

Co-host airlines, however, do

only periodical statements are available from host

airlines instead of up-to-the-second information (Computer Reservation, 1985,
p. 27).

By the time they receive the information, it could be too late to do

anything.
According to the president of American, Robert L. Crandall, SABRE's
arrangement of information provided travel agents with two advantages:
way to operate the business more efficiently and a way to serve customers

a
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quickly and effectively (1983).

Biased CRSs could facilitate travel agents when

frequent flier members book their flights (Computer Reservation, 1985, p. 14).
For example, when an American's frequent flyer member asks a travel agent
with SABRE to book his flight, the biased screen would facilitate the process
because American's flight schedules would appear on the first screen.
Another positive aspect of biased CRSs is that the profit generated from the
biased CRSs, called "incremental revenues," can be passed along to travel
agents or to co-host airlines by lowering usage fees, or to passengers by
lowering ticket prices, and travel agents can conveniently gain quick access
to the most popular flights which are generally those of the host airline
(Computer Reservation, 1985, p. 14, 24; "Airline Reservation," 1985).
The CAB and the Department of Justice (DOJ) found that American's and
United's high market shares allowed these airlines to take advantage of other
airlines (Computer Reservation, 1985, p. 29)6 .

Although the government could

not determine any wrongdoing by American and United, it imposed some
regulations.

On November 14, 1984, only some weeks before the CAB handed a

regulation baton to the DOT, it adopted some rules.

The rules ban both explicit and statistical (indirect) bias in
search routines. For example, CRS may not use the name of
airlines as a display criterion.
Charges to a participating airline must not be "unfair or
discriminatory."

6Jn the early 1980s, Sabre and Apollo dominated the CRS market
with a 80% share collectively and shared the share almost equally
(41% and 39%, respectively). But toward the end of the decade the
collective share had dropped 15%, and the gap between the two
widened with American (36%) leading ahead of United (26%) .
"American Rediscovers," 1982, p. 68; Bozman, 1988, p. 27.

._,...
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Contracts between CRS owners and travel agencies are
limited to five years.
CRS owners are required to supply co-host airlines with
any marketing, sales , and booking data they elect to
generate on "reasonable and non-discriminatory terms ."
The CAB determined that the rules should terminate on
December 31, 1990, unless the DOT determines that the rules
should remain in effect ("Airline Reservation," 1985;
Computer Reservation, 1985, p. 12).

As a reaction of the CAB rules, American and United provided a nonbiased "primary" display along with a biased "secondary" display.

The CAB

assumed that with this option , travel agents would choose the primary display.
It turned out that incentive plans made the primary display less attractive to
use.

Travel agencies even had an option of locking out the primary display so

that their travel agents could only use the secondary display.
primary display reportedly still contained some bias.

Also, the

On March 26, 1985, the

owners voluntarily agreed to eliminate the secondary display (Computer
Reservation, 1985, p. 26).

Although display bias may have disappeared, CRSs

can still have some different biases.

For example, when a travel agent tries to

book a co-host's flight through a CRS, it can make the process more
complicated than if the agent is booking the CRS-owner's flight (Bartimo,
Payne, Hawkins & Ellis, 1990).

g. Future Direction of CRSs

Many CRSs have become interorganizational systems--automated
information systems shared by one or more companies that will significantly
contribute to enhanced productivity, flexibility, and competitiveness for many
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companies (Cash, McFarlan, McKenney & Applegate, 1992, p. 151).

The CRS

owners not only maintain their CRSs but also try to offer travel agents a better
system so that they will stay with them and, therefore, increase their airline
ticket sales.

This process takes a huge investment, and this is why the owners

need partners (Bartimo, Payne, Hawkins & Ellis, 1990).

One expert expects that

joint ventures will become the rule rather than the exception (Hopper, 1990).
Due to the upgrading costs , net earnings for the eight major airlines fell 96%
in 1989.

A CRS partnership permits CRS owners to enjoy the economies of scale

(Bartimo, Payne, Hawkins & Ellis, 1990).
TWA and Northwest's agreement of 1987 to co-own PARS became the
first movement of its kind in the industry (Houston, 1987).
purchased 50% of TWA's PARS' interest for $140 million.
its flight schedule available to more travel agencies.

Northwest
This investment made

Also, instead of co-

hosting a CRS, co-owning the CRS gave Northwest more control over the CRS.
American and Delta in 1989 attempted to create a new company that
would have combined their CRSs.

The combination of the first (37%) and fifth

(6 %) CRS market shares would have created 43 % with 17,000 travel agencies
(Shifrin, 1989).

The other airlines appealed to the government to stop the

merger plan claiming that it would reduce competition with a fewer number
of players and that it would further widen the gap between the first place and
the others (McCarroll, 1989).

The Department of Justice (DOJ) agreed and

blocked the merger in June 1989 (Pastore, 1989).

The DOJ, however, did not

object to a merger between Delta's DATAS II and PARS , which became
WorldSpan with a little over 20% of market share in February 1990 ("Need for
Information,"

1990).
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United had established the Apollo Service Division (called Covia) that
eventually was spun off as United's wholly owned subsidiary in 1987
(Livingstone, 1988; Sehr, 1988).

Covia decided to sell half of its interest to

USAir and several European airlines for about $500 million in 1990 (Bradsher,
1990).
Since 1976 the airlines have spent several hundred million dollars on
agency automation and have aggressively increased their CRS market share
("Do Airlines," 1983).
saturated.

Toward the end of 1980s, the domestic CRS market became

In 1988, 90% of 40,000 travel agencies in the United States were

automated (Belitsos, 1988).

In 1990, 93% of them were said to be automated

(Bartimo, Payne, Hawkins & Ellis, 1990).

When a market is saturated, a

company in the market needs to develop a new product or find a market in a
different location to generate more revenues (Hunger & Wheeler, 1993).
American and United aggressively followed these paths.

Both airlines tried,

although one failed, to advance into Europe by reaching an agreement with a
European CRS, and with the help of new information technology available
they introduced new reservation services.
American, which has flown internationally since 1986 (Securities and
Exchange, 1992, p. 4) tried to become a multinational CRS owner.

In November

1990, American signed a joint marketing and operating agreement with
Amadeus, an international CRS founded in mid-1987 by Air France, Iberia,
Lufthansa, German Airlines, and Scandinavian Airlines System ("Need for
Information," 1990).
independent.

This joint venture would have left the two companies

Subsequent disagreements, however, terminated the

negotiations (Feldman, 1992).

35
Apollo, on the other hand, successfully expanded to Europe.

Apollo and

Galileo, formed by a group of major European airlines in 1987 (some of which
co-own Covia), agreed to merge into the first global system, called Galileo
International (Salpukas, 1992; Feldman, 1992; Cooney, 1993)

Since Apollo's

controller, Covia, is already partly owned by some of the nine airlines, the
process of merger went smoothly.

This merger was expected to give United an

advantage in the race to become a global airline, even though this merger did
not give United the major control over the system (Saplukas, 1992)7.

Galileo

International will maintain and market Apollo and Galileo as separate entities.
Apollo will be marketed in the U.S., Mexico, and Japan;

Galileo in all other

markets (Cooney, 1993).
American has two flight-booking services available that make it
possible to bypass travel agents.

One has been available since 1985, called

Eaasy SABRE--two 'a's for American Airlines (Wheeler, 1987).

Through one of

several on-line information services , subscribers can make their own
reservations on their PCs.

Charges are different depending on the on-line

Examples are 21¢ a minute to $9.95 a month for unlimited usage

companies.
(Ellis, 1990).

The other is called Commercial SABRE which started in January of

1987 (Wheeler, 1987).

With this service, companies can have access to

American's mainframe and can book airline flights, hotel reservation, and car
rentals through Data General's CEO distributed office automation system or via
modem.

Although it is feasible to eliminate travel agents, they still must issue

the tickets ("Air Wars" 1986; Wheeler, 1987).

7 The percentages of the ownership are United 38%, British Airway
14.65%, Swissair 13.22%, KLM 12.09% , Alitalia 8.71 %, Olympic 1.03%,
USAir 11 %, Air Canada 1%, and Aer Lingus, Austrian and TAP Air
Portugal 0.1% each. Feldman, 1992.
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Galileo International also plans to introduce a PC-accessible service,
called Personal Apollo, in 1994.

Using the software on PCs, passengers can

have access to Apollo and book flights, hotel rooms, and rental cars, among
other things.

It claims to offer more functions and to be easier to use than

American's PC-based services (Eckerson, 1993).
Another information technology innovation of airline reservations
emerged in 1992.
(ETDN).

The system is called electronic ticket delivery network

The network allows ready access to airplane tickets.

Travelers can

receive tickets from their travel agents at remote sites, such as hotels and
airports.

A former owner of a travel agency carne up with this idea to

overcome two problems: time and cost.

For traveling business people, a half-

day wait for a ticket can interfere with their travel schedules.

And for travel

agents, the cost of sending discount tickets by express mail does not justify the
earnings, considering the small commission of the agent (10% of, say, a $99
one-way ticket).

ETDN is in use today and is expected to become popular

although its development has been slow (Fotos, 1992).

•"
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VI. CONCLUSION

American Airlines and United Airlines pioneered the concept of
automating and integrating their reservation processes in the late 1950s and
the early 1970s.
industry standards.

Their CRSs, SABRE and Apollo, respectively, have set the
Although a few other systems exist, SABRE and Apollo

retain a large CRS market share.

This significant market share of SABRE and

Apollo allows their owners to exercise biased practices against other airlines
whose flight schedules are also on the systems.

As the allegedly biased use of

the CRSs became significant, the U.S . government set rules for fair access.

But

to what extent are the rules being followed today?
The current trend in the airline industry has been co-owning CRSs to
share expenses among owners and merging systems to gain more access to
markets domestically and internationally.

The latest development in making a

reservation that information technology has made possible is that travelers
can make reservations from home PCs, and that travel agents can send tickets
electronically and print then at remote sites.
The CRS innovation allowed the airline companies to alter the
conditions of effectiveness and competitiveness and to change prices and
conditions quickly and frequently after the deregulation (Schultz, 1992).

The

information technology that made the existence of the CRSs possible gave
their owners a competitive advantage and the power to steer the industry, as
well as the trouble of the lawsuits against their monopoly power.
remain the critical factor in the success of the airline industry.

The CRSs will
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